Go Figure - Pricing & Segmentation - Part 4 of 4

Here is the fourth and final part of Tim Harford’s fantastic article on pricing and segmentation.
Perhaps you are a company director rubbing your hands with glee as you read this, planning to deploy a range of clever price-targeting strategies in your own business. Before you get too excited, you’ll need to deal with the leaks in your price-targeting system. There are two potentially catastrophic leaks or great holes in an otherwise brilliant marketing scheme. If you don’t deal with them, your plans will be in ruins.
The first problem is that supposedly price-insensitive customers may not play the self-targeting game. It’s not hard to persuade price-sensitive customers to steer clear of an expensive product, but sometimes it is more difficult to prevent the price-insensitive customers from buying the cheaper one. This is not a problem in the case of small price differences; we have already seen that you can get some customers to pay a modest mark-up in absolute terms, but the mark-up can be huge in relative terms.
Some of the most extreme examples come from the transport industry: travelling first class by rail or air is much more expensive than buying a standard ticket, but since the fundamental effect is to get people from A to B, it may be hard to wring much money out of the wealthier passengers. In order to price-target effectively, companies may have to exaggerate the differences between the best service and the worst. There is no reason why standard-class railway carriages shouldn’t have tables, for instance, except that potential first-class customers might decide to buy a cheaper ticket when they see how comfortable standard class has become. So the standard-class passengers have to do without.
The 19th-century French economist Emile Dupuit pointed to the early railways as an example: “It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third- class carriage or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches… What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from travelling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich… And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean to the second- class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class customers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.”
The shoddy quality of most airport departure lounges across the world is surely part of the same phenomenon. If the free departure lounges became comfortable, then airlines would no longer be able to sell business-class tickets on the strength of their “executive” lounges. And it would also explain why flight attendants sometimes physically restrain passengers from the cheap seats from stepping off the plane before the passengers from first and business class. This is a “service” aimed not at economy-class passengers but at those looking on in pity and disgust from the front of the plane. The message is clear: keep paying for your expensive seats, or next time you might be on the wrong side of the flight attendant.
In the supermarkets, we see the same trick: products that seem to be packaged for the express purpose of conveying awful quality. Supermarkets will often produce an own-brand “value” range, displaying crude designs that don’t vary whether the product is lemonade or bread or baked beans. It wouldn’t cost much to hire a good designer and print more attractive logos. But that would defeat the object: the packaging is carefully designed to put off customers who are willing to pay more. Even customers who would be willing to pay five times as much for a bottle of lemonade will buy the bargain product unless the supermarket makes some effort to discourage them. So, like the lack of tables in standard-class railway carriages and the uncomfortable seats in airport lounges, the ugly packaging of “value” products is designed to make sure that snooty customers self-target price increases on themselves.
Consider a hypothetical organisation, TrainCorp, a passenger train company. TrainCorp owns a train that always travels full. Some of the seats go at a discount of £50 to leisure travellers who booked in advance, to senior citizens, to students or to families. The other tickets cost the full price of £100 and are bought by commuters and other business travellers. This is a fairly standard group-targeting strategy: by giving away a few low-price tickets, TrainCorp restricts supply and acquires the ability to demand high prices by offering tickets to only the buyers with the highest willingness to pay. (It might be profitable for TrainCorp just to fence off some of the seats and restrict supply that way, but it’s even better for them to fill the spare seats if they can.)
We know at once - if we are economists - that this is inefficient. In other words, we can think of something that would make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off.
That something is to find a commuter who was willing to pay a little less than £100, say £95, and who decided to travel by car instead, and offer him a seat for £90. Where does the seat come from, since the train is full? Well, you take a student who is in no great hurry and was willing to pay a little more than £50, say £55, for the seat and politely throw him off the train. But you refund the price of his ticket, plus an extra £10 for his trouble.

Where do we stand now? The comuter was willing to pay £95 but only paid £90. He’s better off by £5. The student was willing to pay £55 for a £50 ticket, so if he’d been allowed to ride, he’d have been only £5 better off. But he has just been given £10, so the student is also happy. And what about TrainCorp? Well, TrainCorp just transformed a £50 ticket into a £90 ticket and made a more profitable sale. Even after paying £10 compensation to the student, the company is £30 ahead. Now everyone’s a winner; or they would be if TrainCorp adopted this system instead of its group price- targeting strategy. But of course, that’s not what happens, because if TrainCorp tried it, commuters who were willing to pay £100 would hang around for the £90 tickets, and students who weren’t willing to pay £50 would buy tickets anyway and wait to be paid to get off. The whole affair would turn out badly for TrainCorp, who is the one who gets to set the prices.
In case your head is spinning a little, here’s the quick-and-dirty summary: the group price-targeting strategy is inefficient because it takes seats away from customers who are willing to pay more, and gives them to customers who are willing to pay less. Yet airlines and railways still use it, because the alternative of individual price-targeting isn’t feasible.
OK, so sometimes price-targeting is less efficient than a uniform price; sometimes it’s more efficient than a uniform price. But we can say more than that. Whenever price-targeting fails to expand the number of sales and merely moves products from people who value them more, like commuters, to people who value them less, like students, as in the case of TrainCorp, it will definitely be less efficient than a uniform price. Whenever price-targeting opens up a new market without affecting the old market, it will definitely be more efficient than a uniform price.
And there’s a middle position. A lot of group price-targeting does a bit of both: it opens up some new markets but also wastefully moves products away from high-value users to low-value users. For example, my book, The Undercover Economist, is published in hardcover at a high price, and the paperback edition emerges later, at a lower price. The aim is to target a higher price at people impatient to hear what I have to say and at libraries. One good result is that the publisher will be able to sell paperbacks more cheaply, because some costs will be offset by the hardcover sales, and so the book will reach more people. One bad result is that the early version is much more expensive than it would be if there was only a single paperback edition, and some buyers will be put off. That’s what life is like in a world of scarcity: when companies with scarcity power try to exploit it, the situation will almost always be inefficient, and - equivalently - we economists will almost always be able to think of something better.
This is an edited extract from “The Undercover Economist” to be published in the US on November 1 (Oxford University Press $26) and in the UK on March 2 2006 (Little, Brown £17.99). cTim Harford 2005.


Posted May 30, 2007
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